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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
ARDEN E. TUTTLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 10205 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant Arden E. Tuttle appeals from his convic-
tion of grand larceny in violation of 76-38-1 and 4, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. 
· DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with the crime of grand 
larceny in the District Court of Sanpete County, State of 
Utah, and upon jury trial was convicted and placed on 
probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the conviction of the appellant 
in the trial court should be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of facts 
as being in accordance with the rule of law that the facts 
on appeal will be reviewed in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's decision. 
Milton S. Harmon is a co-owner of a hardware store in 
Manti, Utah (Tr. 38, 39). On the 18th day of November, 
1961, the appellant purchased coal at Mr. Harmon's store 
and was the last customer to leave (Tr. 39 through 41). 
Mr. Harmon closed the store, left $11 in the till and at the 
time of closing, there were eight or nine guns on the prem-
ises (Tr. 50). The next day Mr. Harmon had occasion to 
go to the store and noticed that five of the guns that had 
been in the store were missing, as was the money from the 
till (Tr. 49, 50). The guns taken were a Winchester Auto-
matic Shotgun, a Remington Pump, a .464 Magnum, a .22 
Pump, and a .22 Single Shot. In addition, a telescope sight 
was missing (Tr. 52), recoil pads, 30.06 shells, .22 caliber 
shells and .22 caliber bird shot (Tr. 54). In addition, ten 
or twelve boxes of 4/ 10 shotgun shells and boxes of Mag-
num shells were also missing, as well as a shotgun cleaning 
kit. Not all these items were discovered to be missing on the 
same day that the larceny was discovered but they were 
determined to be missing after their presence was missed 
a short time later. An examination of the premises dis-
closed that one of the windows in the store had been pried 
from the outside (Tr. 57 and 93). The appellant was ques-
tioned concerning the larceny and denied any involvement. 
Subsequently, on November 9, 1963, Richard Harmon, 
the grandson of Milton Harmon, while hunting near the 
Gunnison Reservoir, discovered four guns and the barrel 
of a .22 caliber rifle (Tr. 37, 38). The guns which were 
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found (Exhibit 10 through 14) matched the description of 
the guns taken from the larceny of Harmon's store. The 
serial numbers on the guns that could be identified matched 
the serial numbers of the guns that had been taken from 
the store (Tr. 59 through 61). 
On or about November 29, 1962, approximately a year 
after the incident and a year prior to the time the guns 
were found, Calvin D. Nielson, Manti City Marshal, went 
with Leonard Harmon, co-owner of the store to the resi-
dence of Mr. and Mrs. Edgar Tuttle, the appellant's father 
and mother. At the time the appellant was in the Air Force 
(Tr. 286) and Mr. Edgar Tuttle was in the Veterans Hos-
pital being treated for a psychiatric disorder (Tr. 264). 
According to Marshal Nielson, he requested ermission of ~ 
Mrs. Tuttle to search the premise , · c udin _Arden's roo . 
The marshal testified that Mrs. Tuttle consented to the 
search. He testified that she asked if he bad a search war-
rant and he replied "no." He denied saying that he could 
get one (Tr. 112 to 114). A search of the room and rafters 
in the room was made and nothing found. !h.ereafter, in 
examining an old phonograph, they discovered some 30.06 
shells, some 4/10 shotgun shells and a telescopic sight (Tr. 
96) . They also found the recoil pads and some empty and 
some full boxes of _.22 caliber shells, and the Magnum shells 
(Tr. 98 to 103). Marshal Nielson said that he did not pry 
anything open nor force any padlock, although Mr. Har-
mon had apparently unscrewed a tin box and a wooden box 
to obtain the contents of these boxes, although their exac 
contents does not appear of record.1 
Subsequently Marshal Nielson saw the appellant in 
Manti on December 23, 1962, when he was in the service 
1 Leonard Harmon was never called as a witness, and when this box was 
opened, either then or later is not clear from the record. 
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(Tr. 103). The appellant admitted taking the property 
and the rifles and indicated that he would pay for the items 
taken (Tr. 104, 105). The appellant told the marshal that 
if he disclosed who was with him when the property was 
taken, he would still have to shield someone (Tr. 132). The 
appellant's father definitely stated in the presence of the 
marshal and the county sheriff that the guns that had been 
stolen could not be returned (Tr. 20). The appellant's 
mother at one time turned over to Richard Harmon some 
pennies and other items (Tr. 164). Sixty pennies had been 
taken in the larceny. Milton Harmon testified that Mrs. ~'L ' 
Tuttle opened the padlocked box and tin box with a screw- 4 
driver and that she had called Mr. Harmon, subsequent to 
th~earch when the items were found in the Gramophone, 
and told h1m to come and get sowe more ~t1 df ( T r. 164) . 
At the time of trial, Exhibits 2 through 8, constituting 
the property obtained during the search of Arden Tuttle's 
room and being the items found in the Gramophone, were 
marked in the presence of the jury as exhibits, and the wit-
nesses testified concerning these exhibits, all without objec-
tion (Tr. 98 through 103, 51 through 56, 181 through 202). 
An objection was made concerning the receipt of Exhibits 2 
through 8 at the time they were offered. That was the first 
time in the trial that it was urged that the exhibits had been 
obtained by an illegal search and seizure (Tr. 211). No 
pretrial motion to suppress Exhibits 2 through 8 was made 
either at the time of the preliminary hearing or before the 
District Court. The trial court received Exhibits 2 through 
8 into evidence as well as Exhibits 10 through 15, being 
the guns ( Tr. 211 ) . Subsequent to the receipt of the ex-
hibits, the appellant Arden Tuttle testified that he pur-
chased the exhibits from the Harmon's store (Tr. 280, 285) 
and that some of the property belonged to his father (Tr. 
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286). The appellant denied admitting guilt but did admit 
the offer to pay for the guns and other items (Tr. 288) . He 
explained that he offered to pay to avoid prosecution and to 
avoid difficulty with the Air Force, since he claimed the 
authorities had threatened him with a dishonorable dis-
charge (Tr. 288). This latter accusation was denied by 
persons present (Tr. 307). 
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBITS 2 THROUGH 8 
SINCE 
(a) THE APPELLANT MADE NO PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE 
EVIDENCE; 
(b) THE APPELLANT FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE EVIDENCE BEING 
DISCLOSED TO THE JURY AND THE JURY HAD FULL VIEW OF 
THE EVIDENCE WITHOUT OBJECTION PRIOR TO ITS RECEIPT 
AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT 
TO OBJECT; 
(c) THE APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO OBJECT BY OFFERING 
AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE AS TO EXHIBITS 2 THROUGH 8; AND 
(d) THE EVIDENCE IS CONFLICTING BUT SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT 
THE SEARCH LEADING TO THE DISCOVERY OF EXHIBITS 2 
THROUGH 8 WAS CONDUCTED UPON PROPER CONSENT. 
(a) It is submitted that the appellant is precluded from 
claiming any error on the theory of an illegal search and 
seizure, since no pretrial motion to suppress evidence was 
made. It should be noted that the search in question was 
conducted on November 29, 1962. Subsequently, on De-
cember 23rd, the appellant was confronted with the allega-
tion that he stole the guns and other property from Har-
mon's store. It is clear from the record that appellant and 
counsel were well aware of the search and the claims 
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against its legality long before the trial. It is clear there was 
adequate opportunity for a pretrial motion. None was 
made. Under these circumstances, it is submitted that this 
was fatal to any claim of error as to the admissibility of the 
evidence. Because of the failure to make a pretrial motion, 
the very evidence sought to be excluded was placed before 
the jury, and referred to often, prior to the time it was 
offered as evidence. This had the effect of letting the jury 
hear everything that, if the claim of illegal search had been 
valid, they should not have heard. In order to avoid this 
very problem, the great majority of courts have required 
7 
that a pretrial motion b'e made to suppress evidence claimed 
to have been obtained as the result of an illegal search and 
seizure and they have held that where the defendant had 
knowledge prior to trial of the facts, supposedly making 
out the illegal search, the failure to make a pretrial motion 
precludes the claim being urged at trial or raised on appeal. 
The federal courts. have generally required that a motion 
to suppress be made prior to trial and have ruled that a 
motion made at the time of trial is untimely. In United 
States v. Sansone, 231 F.2-d. 887 (2nd Cir. 1956), a claim 
of error on appeal was denied where a motiqn to suppress 
was not made until the time of trial where the search had 
been made five months prior. See also Zachary_ v. United 
States, 275 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1960); Karp v. United 
States, 277 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. 
Romero, 249 F.2d 371 (2nd Cir. 1957); United States v. 
Volkell, 251 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1958), cert. den. 356 U.S. 
962; United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697 (2nd Cir. 
1963), cert. den. 375 U.S. 933; United States v. Milano .. 
vich, 303 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. den. 371 U.S. 
R76: Rule41 (e), F. R. C. P. 
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In Moore v. United States, 56 F.2d 794 (lOth Cir. 1932), 
it was stated: 
"A notebook was introduced, which had been found 
in the car, for the purpose of proving ownership of the 
car. It was admitted and counsel contends this was 
error, because it was obtained by an illegal search and 
seizure. It was not error to admit such notebook for 
two reasons. Moore had knowledge of the seizure at 
the time it was made and raised no objection until it 
was offered in evidence. His objection therefore came 
too late." 
See also Butler v. United States, 153 F.2d 993 (lOth Cir. 
1946). 
The rna· o · f state courts also support this rule. In 
Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunz zes, o . 2, page 661 
(1961): 
"When an aggrieved person believes incriminatory 
evidence has been unlawfully taken from his posses-
sion, and is intended to be used against him in a crimi-
nal prosecution, it is incumbent upon that person to 
make timely objection to the .introduction of such evi-
dence. The failure of a defendant to make such timely 
motion to suppress, could well f.oreclose his right to 
object to the admissibility of evidence wrongfully ob-
tained. When such right is lost to an accused for that 
reason, the prohibition persists in all future and sub-
sequent proceedings as it has been held that a failure 
to make timely motion to suppress evidence constitutes 
a waiver of such right." 
1~583,itis~ 
"Assuming that evidence obtained by an unlawful 
search and seizure is inadmissible, it is necessary for 
the accused who desires such evidence to be excluded 
at his trial to make a timely objection to its introduc-
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tion; otherwise the right to object is lost. Where no 
timely motion to suppress the evidence is made, evi-
dence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure is 
admissible not only in the proceeding in which the 
constitutional guaranty is waived, but in any and all 
subsequent proceedings in which it may be material. 
* * * 
"In most jurisdictions in which evidence obtained 
by an unlawful search and seizure is ihadmissible, the 
rule prevails that, as a general proposition subject to 
certain limitations, an objection to evidence as ob-
tained by an unlawful search and seizure comes too 
late where it has been made the first time at the trial, 
and not by a pretrial motion to return the property 
or suppress the evidence. * * *', 
In State v. Conner, 59 Ida. 695, 89 P.2d 197 ( 1939), the 
Idaho Supreme Court expressed the requirement that a 
pretrial motion to suppress was necessary bef~re illegally 
obtained evidence could be challenged. The court gave the 
reasons for the rule: 
"* ?C· * It must be borne in mind that a proceeding to 
suppress evidence, because procured in violation of a 
defendant's constitutional rights, is not a part of his 
trial. It is separate and apart from the trial, and the 
reason for the rule is th re the fendant has had 
an opportunity to petition for the suppression q_ the 
evidence before the trial he must do so or will be held 
to I_J3ve 5§jved it for, to pefmit inqu1ry as to the :ad-
missibility of the evidence,_during the trial, would cer-
tainTy result in expensive delay and might result in 
confusion. In view of the purpose of the rule, requir-
ing that the application to suppress be made before 
trial, it must be and is held to require that it be made 
early enough, when possible, to cause no interference 
with the progress of the trial. This cannot be accom-
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plished by making the application after the jury has 
been examined and accepted and before it is sworn." 
See also State v. Spencer, 74 Ida.173, 258 P.2d 147 ( 1953). 
The following cases have supported that position: Potman 
v. State, 259 Wise. 234,4 7 N.W.2d 884 ( 1951) ; Chicago v. 
Lord,3 Ill.App. 2d410, 122N.E.2d439 (1954) ;andState 
v. McDaniels, 75 Mont. 61, 243 P. 810 ( 1925). Cases from 
courts adopting the exclusionary rule as a result of Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S . .643 ( 1961), have also required that a pre-
trial motion to suppress be made. State v. Bailey, 23 Conn. J.J 
Supp. 405, 184 A.2d 61; State v. Pokini, 367 P.2d 499 (''IJ 
(Hawaii 1961); Vealesv.State,374P.2d 792 (Okla. Crim. 
1962) ; Colorado ·Rules of Criminal Procedure, 41 (e) ; 
1Hawaii Rules of Criminal Procedure, 41 (e). See also Com-_ 
1
Jmonwealth v. Lewis, 191 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. 1964). 
i It is submitted, therefore, that by the great weight of 
authority, a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, which 
is claimed to have been obtained as a result of a unconstitu-
tional search and seizure, should have been made. It seems 
absurd to attempt to try the question of an illegal search, 
which is principally a question of law for the trial court, 
before the jury and then advise the jury to disregard what 
they have seen and thus connected to the accused. It is sub-
mitted that the trial court correctly ruled the evidence ad-
missible in this case since the appellant did not make a . 1 ~- ~ .• ;; timely pretrial motion to suppress. ~ !Jj}Jr/ 
(b) At the time of trial, the prosecutor had marked for ~ 
identification Exhibits 2 through 8 without objection from 
the appellant (Tr. 98 to 100). 
The testimony of City Marshal Nielson, relating to the 
recovery of the items from the home of the parents of 
appellant was also admitted into evidence without objec-
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tion (Tr. 95, 96). Marshal Nielson was cross-examined by 
the appellant's counsel concerning Exhibits 2 through 8 and 
the nature of the search conducted at the home of appel-
lant's parents (Tr. 115 to 120). The exhibits were in open 
court and could be seen by the jury and had been referred 
to by witnesses. It would appear that undoubtedly refer-
ence was made to these exhibits at the time of opening argu-
ment and no objection was voiced. The only objection came 
at the time they were offered, although there had been sub-
stantial reference to the exhibits and the jury was clearly 
apprized of the circumstances of their discovery and their 
connection with the case. Under these circumstances, it is 
submitted that appellant waived any basis for objection to 
the evidence. 
In McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d 272 (lOth Cir. 
1962), the appellant was tried and convicted of transporta-
tion in interstate commerce of stolen property. A pretrial 
motion on behalf of the appellant to suppress the seized evi-
dence was heard before the case going to the jury. The 
court took the matter under advisement. Counsel for the 
appellant, while the matter was under advisement, advised 
the jury of the nature of the search and the fact that the 
appellant had the property in his possession. On appeal the 
court ruled that by bringing the evidence before the jury 
without objection, the appellant could not complain of the 
admission of the evidence. The court stated: 
"Any question that may have existed concerning the 
admission of the seized property into evidence was dis-
posed of by the opening statement of defense counsel. 
There, in effect, he admitted defendant's possession of 
the property, advised the jury of the defendant's ex-
planation of how he came into possession of it and 
limited the issue in the case to the question of the de-
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fendant's knowledge the property had been stolen. 
The jury was thus advised of the existence and defend-
ant's possession of the very evidence which he sought 
to have suppressed and kept from the jury's considera-
tion. No legal reason then remained for the suppres-
sion of the evidence. Moreover, no necessity then 
existed for the government to offer such property into 
evidence nor could any prejudice result to the defend-
ant by its admission" if offered., .. 
In United States v. Peckham, 105 Fed. Supp. 775 (D.C. 
D.C.), defendant was charged with the crime of abortion. 
The trial court prior to trial had granted a motion to sup-
press certain evidence. Subsequently, the defendant used 
the suppressed evidence to refresh his memory, thus in 
effect bringing the matter before the jury. On motion for 
new trial, Judge Holtzoff ruled that defendant, by allow-
ing the evidence to come before the jury, had waived the 
previous benefits given by the suppression order. He stated: 
"* * * The defendant waived the benefits by him-
self producing copies of those cards and using them 
to refresh his own recollection on the witness stand." 
It is submitted that since the appellant allowed the prose-
cution to place Exhibits 2 through 8 before the jury and 
allowed witnesses to discuss the recovery of those exhibits 
so that the jury was fully apprized of their connection to the 
defendant, the appellant's objection came too late and any 
claim of illegality has been waived. 
(c) Subsequent to the testimony of Marshal Nielson and 
other witnesses concerning Exhibits 2 through 8, all with-
out objection on the basis of illegal search and seizure, ap-
pellant's counsel cross-examined concerning these exhibits 
and subsequently placed the appellant on the stand, and 
the appellant testified that he purchased the exhibits. It is 
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submitted that on the basis of the authorities cited above, 
the affirmative action by the appellant in presenting evi-
dence to the jury constitutes a waiver of any claim of ille-
gality on appeal. 
(d) It is submitted that the trial court properly received 
into evidence Exhibits 2 through 8. The appellant in his 
brief confuses the evidence consisting of Exhibits 2 through 
8, recovered on November 29th, 1962, with evidence re-
covered by a private person, Milton Harmon, on or about 
December 7th (compare Tr. 95 with Tr. 165). On No-
vember 29, 1962, the day the evidence consisting of Ex-
hibits 2 through 8 was recovered, City Marshal Nielson 
in company with Leonard Harmon went to the home of 
appellant's parents (Tr. 95). Appellant was away in the 
Air Force and according to Marshal Nielson, they asked 
Mrs. Tuttle if they could search the whole house and she 
approved. She asked if they had a search warrant and 
they told her no. It was asked upon cross-examination of 
Marshal Nielson if he did not in fact say that they could get 
one. Marshal Nielson denied making such a statement 
(Tr. 112 to 115). He further denied making any threats. 
Leonard Harmon was never called as a witness by either 
side. Contrary to the assertions made in appellant's brief, 
the situation in which the padlocked b2x was unscrewed 
and items removed is not the same situation as when Ex-
hibits 2 through 8 were recovered from the phonograph 
(see Exhibits 27 ~Q 28 'Xhich are the items alle.s-edly un-
scre"\:ed which did not contain Exhibits 2 through 8) . 
Therefore, at the time the court received into evidence 
Exhibits 2 through 8, there was no testimony but the testi-
mony of Marshal Nielson relating to the time he and 
Leonard Harmon searched the premises with the consent of 
appellant's mother. 
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The incident involving the two boxes which were alleg-
edly, unscrewed and the contents recovered occurred there-
after and involved only Milton Harmon, a private person 
(Tr. 164 and 181). Although there is some evidence in 
Marshal Nielson's testimony that Leonard Harmon un- ~ / 
screwed a box, it does not appear that this was the phono- !/ 
graph where the items were received but rather it appear 
to be defendant's Exhibit 28 (Tr. 116). The trial court, 
therefore, had no evidence contradicting Marshal Nielson 
at the time Exhibits 2 through 8 were offered. The posture 
of the evidence at that time clearly indicated that the search 
was with the consent of the appellant's mother and Exhibits 
2 through 8 were found in an old Gramophone. The search 
had not been over Mrs. Tuttle's protest or a mere acquies-
cence in police authority. Although subsequently, appel-
lant's mother testified that force had been used to cause her 
to consent to the search, this evidence came long after the 
trial court's ruling. It is apparent, therefore, that the con-
flict in testimony presented an issue of fact for the trial 
court to rule upon. The trial court saw fit to believe Marshal 
Nielson and to reject the testimony of Mrs. Tuttle. This 
being so, there is ample evidence to sustain the trial court's 
admission. Many basis exist for denying appellant's con-
tentions on appeal. 
First, since the appellant did not offer evidence as to any LJ~~ circumstances which would support th~ lack of consent rv 
prior to the court's ruling, consent was demonstrated at 
the time the trial court received the evidence. Therefore, ~ 
the receipt was proper. . 
Second, it appears that at the time the boxes were un- { ~ 
screwed, Mrs. Tuttle might have opened the boxes or, in .,. 1~ / _, \ 
any event, .~ Harmon, both of whom are private per- \~""' -4 ~ 
sons. T~tions of private persons are not within the ~ . .1'\p 
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prohibitions of the exclusionary rule against receiving evi-
dence illegally seized. Burdeau v. M cDowellJ 256 U.S. 465 
( 1921) ; Search and Seizure Since M appJ 36 University of 
Colorado Law Review 391, 398 ( 1964); The.Federal Law 
of Search and SeizureJ F.B.I., page 7 ( 1962). 
Third, even if Leonard Harmon, who accompanied 
Marshal Nielson on the 29th, did unscrew a bo~2 e is no 
~showing that Exhibits 2 through 8 were in th t bo The evidenc · ly to the effect that they were ound in the mopho . 
In State v. BryanJ 16 U.2d -, 395 P.2d 534 ( 1964), this 
court observed that where a party consents to a search, the 
search is rendered constitutionally unobjectionable. In 
Smuk v. PeopleJ 72 Colo. 97, 209 P. 636 (1922), it was 
recognized that it is permissible for a person who controls 
the premises to consent to a search being made. In the 
instant case, it was clear that Arden Tuttle, the appellant, 
did not own the home where Exhibits 2 through 8 were 
kept. It does not appear from the record that he was rent-
ing or was otherwise in control of any particular area, but 
was away in the Air Force. A parent may consent to the 
search of premises he owns which are used by his child. 
United States v. Roberts, 179 F. Supp. ( 1959); United 
States v. ReesJ 193 F. Supp. 849 (Md. 1961). In the latter 
case the facts are almost identical to the facts in the instant 
case. The home was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Rees, Sr. The 
court indicated that Mr. and Mrs. Rees had the right to 
authorize a search of the entire house. The premises were 
in no way rented to the son. The defendant's mother and 
father gave the F.B.I. consent to search their home. Dur-
ing the search of the defendant's room, a search was made 
of a crawl space in the room. Agents found a suitcase tagged 
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with the name of a third party. The defendant's father gave 
permission to open the suitcase. A revolver was found link-
ing the defendant with a murder and a, kidnapping. The 
court upheld the search on the grounds that the father, hav-
ing complete control over the dwelling of the child, and 
having granted no specific area of exclusive control to the 
child, the search was proper. This is a substantially different 
situation from the case of a hotel roomer or a paid roomer 
having some degree of exclusivity over the premises. The 
appellant has called the court's attention to the case of 
Holzhey v. United Statef, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955). 
11 
IL ( 
That case is entirely different from the instant case since ~ tJ ... 
thejtems were found in a locked cabinet, whereas the items 
he...re were found in a Gramo~. In this case there was 
no evidence to indicate that the son owned the Gramo-
phone or that the parents did not retain control or pos;es-
sion of that Item. The search authorized in the H olzhey 
case was authorized by the daughter and son-in-law, who 
did not necessarily have permission to allow search of the 
cabinet. When the police approached the cabinet, the 
daughter and son-in-law made statements to the effect that 
the cabinet did not belong to them and that they were not 
authorized to allow the search. Thus, the facts are entirely 
different than those in the instant case. Here, according to 
Marshal Nielson, the appellant's mother authorized the 
search of the whole house. The items found were found in 
a Gramophone which was not locked and which apparently 
did not belong to the appellant. This case, therefore, falls 
within the doctrine of the Rees case approving the search 
upon consent. 
The appellant has also indicated that the discussion con-
cerning a search warrant indicates that the consent was in-
voluntary. To the contrary, according to the Marshal he 
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advised the appellant's mother that he had no warrant and 
did not tell her that he could get one. Thus, Mrs. Tuttle 
was fully appraised that the officer's authority was limited, 
thereby establishing limits on his own authority, which sup-
ports the inference that the search was the result of consent. 
See 113 Pennsylvania Law Review 260-268 ( 1964). 
In People v. Torres, 158 Cal. App. 2d 213, 322 P.2d 300 
( 1958), the court noted the following facts: 
"The facts bearing upon this narrow issue may be 
stated briefly. At approximately 6: 00 p.m. on March 
19, 1957, Officer King of the Narcotics Division of the 
Los Angeles Police Department was informed by Ser-
geant Bitterhoff of the Robbery Division that a man 
named Tony residing at 136 West 69th Street was sell-
ing narcotics. At approximately 9:45 p.m. on March 
19, 1957, Officer King was standing in front of the 
residence at the given address when appellant (whose 
nickname was Tony) opened the door and came out. 
The officers identified themselves as police officers and 
stated to appellant that they had information that he 
was using and dealing in narcotics. He denied the 
accusatory statement. The officers then asked him 
whether 'it would be all right if we'd look in the house.' 
Appellant answered, 'yes, go ahead.'" 
Based thereon, the court ruled the search voluntary, com-
menting: 
"A search of a house with the express, free and 
voluntary consent of a householder suspected of pos-
sessing narcotics is neither unreasonable nor unlaw-
ful. It follows that contraband found and seized in 
the course of such a search may lawfully and properly 
be received in evidence against the accused. People v. 
Burke, 47 Cal.2d 45,301 P.2d 241; People v. Michael, 
45 Cal.2d 751,290 P.2d852; People v. Hood, 149 Cal. 
App.2d 836, 309 P.2d 135. It is true as pointed out in 
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People v. Michael, supra, that one need not forcibly 
resist an officer's assertion of authority to search, but if 
he freely consents to a search, then neither the search 
nor the seizure of evidence found in the course thereof 
is unreasonable. As the court there stated ( 45 Cal.2d 
at page 753, 290 P.2d at page 854), 'Whether in a 
particular case an apparent consent was in fact volun-
tarily given or was in submission to an express or im-
plied assertion of authority, is a question of fact to be 
determined in the light of all the circumstances.' To 
the same effect are People v. Lujan, 141 Cal. App.2d 
143, 296 P.2d 93, and People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 
291 P.2d 469. Since the question is one of fact pri-
marily for the trial court's determination, the finding 
of that court, SYJ?ported by substantial evidence, is 
binding upon an appellate court. People v. Hood, 
supra, 149 Cal. App.2d 836,838,309 P.2d 135; People 
v. Allen, 142 Cal. App.2d 267, 281, 298 P.2d 714; 
People v. Smith, 141 Cal. App.2d 399, 402, 296 P.2d 
913." 
See also People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d45, 301 P.2d 241 ( 1956) 
where the California Supreme Court found similar facts 
sufficient to show consent. 
In State v. Bryan, supra, and State v. Louden, 15 U.2d 
64., 387 P.2d 240, 242 ( 1963), this court observed: 
"* * * Whether the evidence was lawfully obtained 
and was admissible in the case was primarily for the 
trial court to determine.'~ 
The trial court in the instant case, at the time the evi-
dence was received, had the testimony of Marshal Nielson 
which clearly evidenced that the search was with consent. 
Evidence indicating lack of consent offered after the evi-
dence was received comes too late. Even so, the trial court 
was not compelled to believe Mrs. Tuttle's statement in 
support of her son, since indeed she had motive for bias. 
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This being so, it was apparent that the search was con-
ducted under circumstances showing consent. Honig v. 
United States, 208 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953) ; State v. 
Bryan, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of the instant case disclose a situation where 
the appellant was clearly guilty of the crime charged. The 
only question raised on appeal is that relative to search and 
seizure. Although the law of search and seizure may have 
been Mapped, as expressed in appellant's brief, it is appar-
ent from the arguments made and the way the case was 
tried that this was a classic on how not to raise the issue of 
search and seizure. The law en Mapped but the 
appellant is a very poo arto ra 
This case should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
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